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     A New (Republican) Litigation State? 
                Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang† 
                                                                            Abstract 
 
It is a commonplace in American politics that Democrats are far more likely than 
Republicans to favor access to courts to enforce individual rights with lawsuits.  In this article 
we show that conventional wisdom, long true, no longer reflects party agendas in Congress.  We 
report the results of an empirical examination of bills containing private rights of action with 
pro-plaintiff fee-shifting provisions that were introduced in Congress from 1989 through 2018.  
The last eight years of our data document escalating Republican-party support for proposals to 
create individual rights enforceable by private lawsuits, mobilized with attorney’s fee awards.  
By 2015-18, there was rough parity in levels of support for such bills by Democratic and 
Republican members of Congress.   
 
This transformation was driven substantially by growing Republican support for private 
enforcement in bills that were anti-abortion, immigrant, and taxes, and pro-gun and religion.  
We demonstrate that this surge in Republican support for private lawsuits to implement rights 
was led by the conservative wing of the Republican party, fueled in part by an apparent belief 
during the Obama years that the president could not be relied upon to implement their anti-
abortion, immigrant, and taxes, and pro-gun and religion agenda.  We conclude that the 
contemporary Republican party’s position on civil lawsuits has become bifurcated, reflecting the 
distinctive preferences of core elements of their coalition.  They are the party far more likely to 
oppose private enforcement when deployed to enforce business regulation, while embracing it 
when deployed in the service of rights for their social conservative base.        
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          INTRODUCTION 
  
Conventional wisdom in American politics and law is that, as between the two political 
parties, it is Democrats who support polices that facilitate “access to courts” by individuals.  This 
conventional wisdom links the plaintiffs’ bar to the Democratic party and business opponents of 
civil legal liability to the Republican party. Professor Yeazell has described “divergent attitudes 
toward civil litigation in the United States” as follows: 
Some view civil litigation as the vindicator of rights, a way of speaking truth to power, 
and a guarantor of democratic values and freedoms. Others see civil litigation as a 
deadweight loss, a stick in the wheels of commerce, and a source of national shame. 
In recent decades these two views have become attached to the major political parties: 
Republicans deploring litigation, Democrats defending it.1   
 
Although the connections of the plaintiff’s personal injury bar to the Democratic party 
have received the most extensive attention,2 scholars have pointed to the apparent influence of 
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1 Stephen C. Yeazell, Unspoken Truths and Misaligned Interests: Political Parties and the Two 
Cultures of Civil Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1752, 1754 (2013). 
 
2 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 
125 YALE L.J. 400, 438-39 (2015) (discussing the alliance of Democrats and trial lawyers in 
opposition to tort reform, and observing that “[t]rial lawyers provide a significant portion of the 
funds relied on by Democratic candidates in both state and federal elections.  Trial lawyers, in 
turn, rely on jury awards to generate the income they channel to Democratic candidates.”); 
Damian Stutz, Non-Economic-Damage Award Caps in Wisconsin: Why Ferdon Was (Almost) 
Right and the Law is Wrong, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 105, 106-07 (2009) (“This attempt to reform the 
tort system on a national level is almost perfectly split along political party lines, with trial 
lawyers lobbying Democrats to oppose reforms, and insurance companies and doctors 
encouraging Republicans to argue the opposite.”); Anthony Champagne, Political Parties and 
Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1411, 1418, 1423 (2001) (observing that in Ohio 
Supreme Court elections Democratic candidates were supported by trial lawyers and 
Republicans by business interests, and that trial lawyers had “develop[ed] long-term working 
relationships with … the Democratic Party.”); Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 
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plaintiffs’ lawyers on Democrats more broadly, fostering litigation across such policy areas as 
civil rights, consumer protection, the environment, securities, health care, and financial products 
regulation,3 shaping rules of civil procedure, such as those governing class actions and summary 
judgment, so as to strengthen plaintiffs’ position in litigation,4 and discouraging alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms that would divert disputes away from litigation.5  In an analysis 
of the parties’ respective positions on federal securities regulation, Professor Romano observed 
that “Republicans’ general support for and Democrats’ opposition to litigation reform that 
restricted liability … paralleled the perspective of key party constituencies, the business 
community for Republicans and the plaintiffs’ bar for the Democrats.”6 We refer to these 
characterizations by Yeazell and Romano as the “party alignment hypothesis.”     
 
2000: Change and Challenge, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 849, 866-67 (2001) (“Since at least 
the early 1990s, Alabama … has seen constant hot contests between Democratic candidates 
supported by plaintiffs' trial lawyers and Republican candidates supported by business 
interests.... For a while, Texas Supreme Court elections were a battleground between liberal 
Democrats supported largely by plaintiffs' trial lawyers and Republicans and conservative 
Democrats supported by business interests.”); David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An 
Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 38 (1995) (In 
ballot measures on tort reform, Democrats are generally aligned with trial lawyers, and 
Republicans with business interests.). 
3 See, e.g., Dave Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6 
OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 123, 146 (2011); Randolph I. Gordon and Brook Assefa, A Tale 
of Two Initiatives: Where Propaganda Meets Fact in the Debate Over America’s Health Care, 4 
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 693 (2006); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005); Stephen C. Yeazell, 
Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV.  1975 
(2004); Robin Jones, Searching for Solutions to the Problems Caused by the “Elephantine 
Mass” of Asbestos Litigation, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 549, 549-50 (2001). 
4 See F. Hodge O’Neal, Class Actions and Limited Vision: Opportunities for Improvement 
through a More Functional Approach to Class Treatment of Disputes, 83 WASH. U. L. Q.  1127 
(2005); Glenn S. Koppel, Populism, Politics, and Procedure: The Saga of Summary Judgment 
and the Rulemaking Process in California, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 455 (1997). 
5 See Mark E. Steiner, Senior Discount: Arbitration of Nursing Home Disputes, 21 J. CONSUMER 
& COM. L. 2 (2017); Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of 
Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J. L. & POL. 645 (1999).  Professor Yeazell reminds us, 
however, that, “for a brief moment,” President Carter bemoaned the amount of litigation and 
favored ADR. See Yeazell, supra note 1, at 1774-75. “Nothing happened, and no subsequent 
Democrat has taken up that banner.” Id. 
6 Romano, supra note 2, at 1561. See also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: 
ITS RISE, FALL AND FUTURE 16 (2015) (“[T]he two major political parties in the United States 
have aligned themselves with the rival camps – Democrats with the plaintiff’s bar, Republicans 
with the business community – and each is heavily financed by its chosen ally.”). 
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  In this article we show that conventional wisdom does not accurately reflect 
contemporary reality.  We report the results of an empirical examination of a random sample of 
bills containing private rights of action and attorney’s fee provisions that were introduced in 
Congress from 1989 through 2018. We show that, as applied to private enforcement of federal 
law, the conventional wisdom captured by the quotations from Professors Yeazell and Romano 
was reasonably accurate for over about the first two decades of our data.  Democratic support for 
statutory provisions facilitating access to court was substantially larger than Republican support.   
  
 However, over the last eight years of our data we document escalating Republican-party 
support for private lawsuits to implement rights.  This transformation was driven substantially by 
growing Republican support for private enforcement in bills that were anti-abortion, immigrant, 
and taxes, and pro-gun and religion. By the end of our data, Republicans were as likely as 
Democrats to sponsor or co-sponsor statutory provisions intended to stimulate private lawsuits.  
We also show that this surge in Republican support for private lawsuits to implement rights was 
led by the conservative wing of the Republican party, fueled in part by an apparent belief during 
the Obama years that the president could not be relied upon to implement their anti-abortion, 
immigrant, and taxes, and pro-gun and religion agenda.     
 
 In Part I we provide an account of recent scholarship on private enforcement that renders 
implausible any strong version of the party alignment hypothesis, and we discuss the origins of 
this project. Before turning to the presentation and analysis of our data, we seek to frame this 
project more clearly in two ways. In Part II we specify why and how the phenomena that we 
interrogate are different from other litigation phenomena involving Republican constituencies or 
interests that are the subjects of recent scholarship, the focus of which is impact litigation by 
interest groups seeking constitutional change. We then discuss in Part III, as context for our 
empirical contributions, work illuminating how constituencies or interests associated with the 
Republican party perceived the normative legitimacy and practical utility of litigation and courts 
as sites to pursue their agendas, and the specific institutional choices they made to leverage them.      
 
I. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN CONTEXT 
 It is a legislative choice to rely on a private right of action in statutory implementation.  
When Congress does choose to rely on private enforcement, it faces a series of additional 
statutory design choices that together have profound consequences for access to court.  These 
choices include allocation of responsibilities for attorney’s fees, who has standing to sue, what 
remedies will be available, and whether a judge or jury will make factual determinations and 
assess damages, among many others.  We refer to this system of rules as a statute’s private 
enforcement regime.7  
Among the incentives that are available to encourage private enforcement of regulatory 
laws, especially important are statutory fee shifting rules that authorize plaintiffs to recover 
 
 
7 See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE, ch. 2 (2010). 
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attorney’s fees if they prevail.  In light of the high costs of federal litigation, even prevailing 
plaintiffs might suffer a financial loss if they had to pay their own attorney’s fees, resulting in a 
disincentive for enforcement.  More realistically, unless they were wealthy or could secure 
representation by a public interest organization, many would not be able to find counsel willing 
to take their case.  By the early to mid-1970s, the liberal public interest law movement and 
congressional Democrats sought to leverage fee shifting across many policy domains to cultivate 
a for-profit bar to achieve day-to-day enforcement of new statutory rights — a function beyond 
the capacity of small non-profit groups.8  
 
Congress’s choice of whether and how much to rely on private enforcement of statutory 
mandates must be understood in institutional context.  The primary alternative is to empower and 
fund administrative authorities to perform that function.9  Conflict between Congress and the 
president over control of the bureaucracy is a perennial feature of the American state, and this 
creates incentives for Congress, seeking an alternative or supplement to bureaucracy, to provide 
for enforcement via private litigation.  This incentive to create private enforcement regimes 
increases with the degree to which Congress distrusts the president to use the bureaucracy to 
carry out statutory mandates.10  Private enforcement is thus a form of insurance against the 
president’s failure to use the bureaucracy to carry out Congress’s will.    
This reason to choose private enforcement became much more significant to American 
public policy beginning in the late 1960s, when divided party control of the legislative and 
executive branches became the norm and relations between Congress and the president became 
more antagonistic.11  The institutional antagonism arising from divided government was 
exacerbated by growing ideological polarization between the parties.12  Both quantitative and 
 
8 See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 10-14 (2017); FARHANG, supra note 7, 
ch.3.  
 
9 See Morris Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative 
Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33 (1982); Matthew Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated 
Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1036 (2006); Margaret Lemos, The Consequences of Congress's Choice of Delegate: Judicial 
and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363 (2010).  
10 See FARHANG, supra note 7; R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE 
RIGHTS (1994); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 
(2001); THOMAS BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER 
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2002); R. Shep Melnick, From Tax and Spend to Mandate 
and Sue: Liberalism after the Great Society, in THE GREAT SOCIETY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF 
LIBERALISM 387 (Sidney Milkis & Jerome M. Mileur, eds. 2005). 
11 See FARHANG, supra note 7, ch. 3. 
 
12 See Gary Jacobson, Partisan Polarization in Presidential Support: The Electoral Connection, 
30 CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY 1 (2003); NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE, & HOWARD 
ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2006). 
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qualitative empirical scholarship have demonstrated that these political-institutional conditions 
were critically important in causing greater congressional reliance on private litigation to enforce 
federal statutes beginning in the late 1960s.13 
In the years of divided government from Nixon’s assumption of office in 1969 through 
the end of Bush II’s presidency in 2008, the chief configuration was Democratic Congresses 
facing Republican presidents.  Thus, in years of divided government Congress was 
predominantly controlled by the Democratic party, with its stronger propensity to undertake 
social and economic regulation,14 and with liberal public interest groups occupying an important 
position within the party coalition.15  This legislative coalition largely faced an executive branch 
in the hands of Republican presidents, the leaders of a political party more likely to oppose social 
and economic regulation, with business groups occupying an important position within the party 
coalition.16  The bulk of private enforcement regimes in federal law—spanning civil rights, 
environmental, consumer, and financial regulation law, among many other areas—were enacted 
by Democratic Congresses under this configuration of divided government.17    
 Although concerns about executive subversion of congressional mandates are predictable 
in a period of divided government when Democrats control Congress and seek more aggressive 
regulation, Republicans too have contributed to private enforcement regimes. Indeed, one of the 
most consequential private enforcement regimes in our history, that which included the pro-
plaintiff attorney’s fee-shifting provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was 
insisted on by Republicans whose votes were needed to break the cycle of filibusters by Southern 
Democrats that had long prevented passage of civil rights legislation.18  Among their motivations 
for embracing private enforcement was to divest the executive branch, long in Democratic hands, 
 
 
13 See FARHANG, supra note 7; Sean Farhang, Legislative-Executive Conflict and Private 
Statutory Litigation in the United States: Evidence from Labor, Civil Rights, and Environmental 
Law, 37 LAW AND SOC. INQUIRY 657 (2012). 
 
14  See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
ROLL CALL VOTING (1997). 
 
15 See MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE STATE: THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL 
EXPERIENCE 86-94 (1994); David Vogel, The 'New' Social Regulation in Historical and 
Comparative Perspective, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE 155-85 (Thomas K. McCraw, ed. 
1981); DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL POWER OF BUSINESS IN 
AMERICA,  ch. 5 (1989). 
 
16  See VOGEL, supra note 15. 
 
17 See Sean Farhang, Regulation, Litigation, and Reform, in THE POLITICS OF MAJOR POLICY 
REFORM IN POSTWAR AMERICA, ch. 3 (Jeffrey Jenkins and Sidney Milkis, eds. 2014).   
18 See FARHANG, supra note 7, at 94-128. 
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of enforcement powers that they feared would be used too aggressively.19  And it was 
Republicans who proposed, and overwhelmingly voted for, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which 
added compensatory and punitive damages and the right to a jury trial to Title VII.  They did so 
in the face of electoral pressures after President Bush I vetoed an earlier version introduced by 
Democrats.20  
 For Republican members of Congress who support – or who are resigned to -- regulatory 
legislation,21 reliance on private enforcement may also be attractive because it obviates the need 
to create another, or augment an existing, central administrative bureaucracy, which would 
consume tax revenue.  Private enforcement is a decentralized and partially privatized 
enforcement strategy.  Its operational costs, other than costs imposed by the additional workload 
of courts,22 are not borne by taxpayers.23 Indeed, Democrats too have found these considerations 
influential in selecting an enforcement strategy.24   
Drawing on this work in Rights and Retrenchment: The Counterrevolution against 
Federal Litigation, we observed that “[e]ven during periods of significant Republican legislative 
 
19 See id., at 107-08. 
 
20 See id., at 187-89. 
 
21 “For much of its growth phase, legal liberalism was not a partisan project, drawing support as 
it did from elite actors in both parties. By the early 1970s, however, the party system was 
changing.” STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 56 (2008). 
 
22 “[T]hese costs are not easily traceable by voters to legislators’ support for a piece of regulatory 
legislation with a private enforcement regime. Thus, with private enforcement regimes, 
legislators can provide for policy implementation at lesser cost than with administrative 
implementation and can minimize blame for what costs are born by government.” Stephen B. 
Burbank, Sean Farhang, and Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 637, 663 (2013). 
 
23 See FARHANG, supra note 7, at 71-72, 81. “In a conceptually tidy universe, the view that 
celebrates litigation might see it as the market alternative to centralized control and government 
regulation. In that universe, litigation enthusiasts would align themselves with the Republican 
Party and celebrate its decentralizing and privatizing virtues.” Yeazell, supra note 1, at 1773. For 
a recent elaboration of this view, see BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR 
CLASS ACTIONS 29-47 (2019). 
 
24 See Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending Act, 
80 GEO. L.J. 233, 246 (1991) (describing the switch from administrative to private enforcement 
during 1960 hearings on the bill, evidently at the behest of the legislation’s initial sponsor, 
Senator Paul Douglas, a liberal Democrat, who “hope[d] that reliance on private enforcement 
would keep the bill simple and avoid another federal bureaucracy”); FARHANG, supra note 7, at 
154-55.  
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power,” while calls to repeal (retrench) existing private enforcement regimes “were emanating 
from some quarters of the Republican Party, there was net growth in the private enforcement 
infrastructure.”25 Moreover, we noted, Republican support for private enforcement has not been 
confined to bills seeking to advance the interests of constituencies or policies traditionally 
associated with the Democratic Party, or even bipartisan constituencies.  We provided a few 
examples of legislation containing private enforcement regimes that Republicans Congresses 
enacted as “a useful regulatory strategy to serve their constituents,” such as management seeking 
to battle unions, and anti-abortion activists seeking to control abortion providers.26  
 The goal of this article is to seek greater empirical and normative understanding of 
Republican support for private enforcement. The project was conceived when we were 
compiling updated congressional bill data for an article on the prospects of Republican 
legislative retrenchment of access to court in the Trump era.  We not only found recent growth in 
Republican bills aiming to limit access to court for traditional Democratic constituencies.27  We 
also observed what appeared to be a substantial increase in newly proposed private enforcement 
regimes in bills introduced by Republicans that were aimed to benefit their base constituents. 
This raised in our minds the question whether     
 [p]erhaps ironically, a signature of Trump era litigation reform may be an escalation of 
 efforts to dismantle the Litigation State of civil rights, environmental regulation, and 
 consumer protection, and replace it with a new Litigation State in the service of an anti-
 abortion, anti-immigrant, anti-union, and pro-gun agenda.28 
Although our accounts of Republican legislative retrenchment efforts were based on 
systematic data,29 our observations about Republican support for private enforcement in 
Congress were not similarly grounded. We have sought to fill that gap by compiling data on 
congressional bills from 1989 through 2018 that included a statutory private right of action and a 
pro-plaintiff fee-shifting provision, on the members of Congress who sponsored or co-sponsored 
 
25 BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 8, at 15 (2017). 
 
26 Id. See also Sean Farhang, Legislative-Executive Conflict and Private Statutory Litigation in the 
U.S.: Evidence from Labor, Civil Rights, and Environmental Law.  37 L. & SOC. INQ.  657 (2012) 
(chronicling Republican enactment of a private right of action for management to sue unions in the 
Taft-Hartley Act).  
27 Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Rights and Retrenchment in the Trump Era. 87 FORD. L. 
REV. 37, 45 (2018). The data compiled for our book ended in 2014. In preparing the article, we 
compiled additional data for the three years 2015-17. 
 
28 Id. at 47. 
 
29 “To investigate retrenchment activity in Congress, we constructed an original dataset of 500 
bills that were introduced over the four decades from 1973 to 2014 and that specifically 
attempted to retrench opportunities and incentives for the enforcement of federal rights.” 
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 8, at 17.  
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those bills, and on a number of potentially salient aspects of the bills. Apart from testing the 
accuracy of our impressions of recent Republican bill activity, we also use the data to explore 
reasons for the transformation in Republicans’ attitudes toward private enforcement of federal 
law. 
The fact that some Republican legislators have long supported private enforcement is 
proof against any strong version of the party alignment hypothesis that posits a clear dichotomy 
between Democratic legislators as proponents, and Republican legislators as opponents, of 
private enforcement. A more capacious view of preferences is needed in order to account for 
Republican support of private enforcement bills initiated by Democrats, such as in Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.30  Likewise, understanding the 
recent apparent upsurge in Republican support for private enforcement may require a more 
nuanced view of preferences, one that is attentive to temporal trends such as shifting ideological 
alignments within the Republican Party and changing partisan control of the presidency.      
 
II. THE ROLES OF LITIGATION 
In this Part we discuss existing scholarship demonstrating how interest groups associated 
with the Republican coalition in American politics have leveraged courts to advance their 
agendas, and we highlight how our focus is on a much more recently growing, and quite 
different, phenomenon.  Whereas the work we discuss below focuses on litigation by interest 
groups seeking constitutional change through judicial interpretation, our focus is on legislative 
efforts to mobilize the private bar to enforce statutory rights created for the Republican base.  
   
Constituencies long associated with the Republican party, including prominently business 
corporations, have always sought to use litigation to advance their interests. Edward Purcell’s 
magisterial history of federal diversity of citizenship litigation31 demonstrates how, as 
defendants, business corporations sought to manipulate the rules governing access to federal 
court in order to inflict expense and delay on their opponents and, prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,32 to take advantage of the business-friendly general federal common law 
jurisprudence of the federal courts. A necessary condition for that activity, sketched by Purcell 
and more fully developed in Adam Winkler’s recent history of the development of corporate 
civil rights,33 was an approach to citizenship for jurisdictional purposes that promoted access to 
federal court by corporations.  
 
30 See supra text accompanying notes 18-20. 
 
31 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN 
INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 (1992). 
 
32 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 
33 ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL 
RIGHTS (2018). 
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 Since corporations were not themselves viewed as citizens [in the early nineteenth 
  century], courts employed the technique of looking to the citizenship of their  
  shareholders instead. In a move that heralded, if it did not reflect, the increasingly  
  important role that corporations played in an increasingly interstate economy, the  
  Supreme Court, in a confusing but heroic bit of fiction-making, blundered to the  
  solution that corporations would be accorded the benefits of citizenship for  
  diversity purposes through an irrebuttable presumption that their shareholders  
  were citizens of the incorporating state.34 
Scholars before Winkler had argued that the Court’s decisions about the citizenship of 
corporations for jurisdictional purposes may have played a role in the subsequent recognition of 
corporations as “persons” under the Fourteenth Amendment.35 But for Winkler, the technique of 
looking beneath the corporation to its shareholders – treating a corporation as an association of 
persons36 -- was central in the development of corporate constitutional rights in general, 
culminating in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.37 Moreover, Winkler chronicled 
nineteenth-century corporate litigation campaigns in pursuit of constitutional protections that, as 
he pointed out, will seem familiar to modern civil rights litigators on both the left and the right: 
 To fight [a California law prohibiting railroads, but not individuals, from   
  deducting mortgages when valuing their land for tax purposes], the Southern  
  Pacific and Central Pacific undertook a litigation campaign that could have  
  served as a template for future civil rights movements. First, the railroads engaged 
  in civil disobedience. They simply refused to pay the taxes and launched a public  
  relations campaign in the newspapers against the law. The counties, which were  
  responsible for collecting the tax, were forced to go to court seeking redress. The  
  courts, however, were exactly where the railroads wanted the controversy to be  
 
 
34 Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A 
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1464-65 (2008) (footnotes omitted).  
 
35 See. e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 
GEO. L.J. 1593, 1642-43 (1988). 
 
36 For a favorable review of Winkler’s book, which nonetheless argues that calling the 
phenomenon he identifies “piercing the corporate veil” is misleading, even metaphorically, see 
Joshua C. Macey, What Corporate Veil? (Book Review), 117 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1198 (2019). 
 
37 558 U.S. 310 (2010). See WINKLER, supra note 33, at 364 (“Corporate personhood – the idea 
that a corporation is an entity with rights and obligations separate and distinct from the rights and 
obligations of its members – is entirely missing from the Court’s opinion … Instead, like many 
of the earlier corporate rights cases, the Citizens United decision obscured the corporate entity 
and emphasized the rights of others, like shareholders and listeners.”). 
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  decided. Judges, especially the ones in federal court, were not likely to share the  
  anticorporate populism of California voters. 
 The railroad corporations were constitutional first movers who employed   
  innovative tactics to secure new rights. They envisioned the lawsuits as a form of  
  strategic litigation, or what their lawyers called “test cases,” to determine   
  whether corporations had the same rights as ordinary people to equal protection  
  and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The railroads did not want  
  merely to lower tax bills in California. They wanted to establish broad new  
  protections against burdensome regulations of all sorts. Their remarkable series of 
  cases – more than sixty in all – would become “landmarks in American   
  constitutional history,” … and “an important turning point in our social and  
  economic development.”38 
     **** 
 Even when the [Supreme Court] ruled against corporations, however, the   
  companies could often count their lawsuits as small victories. Their never-ending  
  string of Fourteenth Amendment lawsuits delayed for years the    
  implementation of countless laws that, like California’s railroad tax,   
  threatened to reduce their profits. Corporate lawsuits also imposed huge   
  costs on government. California’s counties spent untold hours and money   
  fighting off the Southern Pacific’s groundbreaking series of test cases,   
  which dragged on for years…. Regardless of the losses, corporations kept   
  litigating case after case.39 
These and other historical accounts remind us that corporations have long used litigation 
to argue for conservative, pro-business interpretations of the Constitution, statutes and common 
law, that are designed to thwart regulation.40  Adversarial legalism—the phenomenon identified 
by Robert Kagan that includes a heavy dose of private lawsuits to implement public policy41—is 
 
38 WINKLER, supra note 33, at 119-20 (quoting HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S 
CONSTITUTION: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE “CONSPIRACY 
THEORY,” AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 31 (1968)). 
 
39 Id. at 158-59. Winkler discussed a study of the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment cases 
from 1868 to 1912, which found that, of 604 total cases, 312 involved corporations, while 28 
involved African Americans. See id. at 155-56 (discussing CHARLES WALLACE COLLINS, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES (1912)). He noted that “[t]o be sure, corporations 
lost plenty of cases – a fact too often ignored in histories of the Lochner era.” Id. at 156. 
 
40 Cf. FITZPATRICK, supra note 23, at 27 (“[F]or most of our history, conservatives preferred 
legal enforcement by private lawyers, because they thought private enforcers of the law were 
better than public enforcers.”). 
 
41 See KAGAN, supra note 10 
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not a child of the 1960s.  Moreover, not all such litigation behavior was defensive. Although 
Kagan argued that “[t]he adversarial legalism that has pervaded the United States in the last few 
decades is both more extensive and more intense than that of the nineteenth century and the first 
half of the twentieth,”42 he also observed that “[i]n the late nineteenth century and the first third 
of the twentieth, business interests often resorted to adversarial legalism, urging the courts to 
strike down pro-labor statutes and to issue injunctions against striking workers.”43 In addition, 
“[l]itigation was the tool of those who opposed the administrative regulations of the Progressive 
Era and the New Deal.”44 
 Turning to the modern period, and to ideologically motivated advocacy organizations, 
Thomas Keck has argued that “[i]n polarized America, advocates on both the left and the right 
engage in litigation more or less constantly to achieve their ends.”45  Analyzing two decades of 
litigation regarding abortion, affirmative action, gay rights and gun rights, Keck posited three 
scenarios in which policy advocates on both sides have used litigation: “to preserve the status 
quo by enjoining new and unwanted policies, to disrupt the policy status quo by dismantling 
existing policies, and to enable democratic politics by clearing the channels of political 
change.”46 
 Keck’s book powerfully makes the case that, in the litigation landscape he surveyed, the 
activity of “left liberal social movements” and of “conservative movements” should be regarded 
as “examples of the same phenomenon.”47 The landscape he surveyed is essentially that of 
constitutional litigation, and it is dominated by “organized rights advocates.” Although Keck also 
discussed “a variety of overlapping and intersecting lawsuits filed by private litigants and 
 
 
42 Robert A. Kagan, American Courts and the Policy Dialogue: The Role of Adversarial 
Legalism, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW 26 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes, eds. 2004).  
 
43 Id. at 25. See also PURCELL, supra note 31, at 206-09 (describing use of federal equity in 
insurance litigation); id. at 222-24 (railroads’ use of state court injunctions against Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act litigation). 
 
44 Yeazell, supra note 1, at 1778. 
 
45 THOMAS M. KECK, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN POLARIZED TIMES 4 (2014). 
 
46 Id. at 20. In this “world of constant litigation by friend and foe, any decision not to litigate 
would amount to an act of unilateral disarmament, leaving the field to their ideological 
opponents.” Id. at 15. See also Richard S. Price & Thomas M. Keck, Movement Litigation and 
Unilateral Disarmament: Abortion and the Right to Die, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 880 (2015). 
 
47 KECK, supra note 45, at 11. 
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attorneys,” he referred to such suits as “wildcat litigation,” noting that they “have regularly 
complicated the efforts of movement attorneys to lead the courts down a preferred path.”48 
 We are interested in a litigation phenomenon that is different in important respects from 
those chronicled by Winkler and Keck.49 Whereas both of them focused on litigation aimed at 
changing constitutional meaning, our interest is primarily in litigation designed to enforce 
statutory rights.  In addition, although the “constitutional first movers” central to their accounts 
are corporations and other organizations that (usually) have or can raise sufficient resources to 
fund their litigation activity, we focus on litigants who (usually) lack such resources.50 Finally, 
whereas courts are at the center of these previous accounts, our institutional interest lies in 
political parties in Congress.  
 Our earlier work shows how and why the strategy of engineering private rights of action 
into federal statutes, and of using fee-shifting (and multiple damages provisions) to mobilize 
lawyers for people and causes that did not have the money to pay them, emerged among liberals 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s.51 This project studies attempts to use the same strategy by 
Republican legislators in the service of very different regulatory goals -- those favored by their 
conservative constituents. As accounts of constitutional litigation involving conservative 
advocates make clear, they came to understand that simply playing defense was not a winning 
strategy, and they modeled their litigation efforts seeking affirmative constitutional rights on 
successful liberal litigation campaigns.52 This project studies a much more recent and less 
recognized development:  Republican legislative efforts to mobilize lawyers, with private rights 
 
48 Id. at 10-11. Keck defined “wildcat litigation” as “social reform litigation that is initiated by 
private litigants and attorneys rather than movement litigators.” Id. at 36. As examples, he 
discussed gay rights and gun rights cases brought by individuals in which movement lawyers 
became involved when they “eventually realized that if they were unable to make the lawsuits go 
away, their best option was to join in and help it succeed.” Id. at 87; see id. at 36-37.  
 
49 There are, of course, also differences between the litigation chronicled by Winkler and that 
chronicled by Keck. For our purposes, the most salient may repose in the issues underlying the 
cases. Winkler’s cases involved regulatory issues primarily affecting business, while Keck’s 
focus was cases primarily affecting individuals. 
 
50 In discussing empirical evidence demonstrating “the plausibility of plaintiff’s fee-shifts and 
damages enhancements as measures of the broader phenomenon of private enforcement regimes, 
and of the efficacy of private enforcement regimes in mobilizing private litigants,” we 
emphasized “that about 98% of these suits were prosecuted by for-profit counsel, and only 2% 
by interest groups.” BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 8, at 14-15. 
 
51 See id. at 4-13. 
 
52 See infra text accompanying notes 59-63. 
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of action and fee shifting, on behalf of clients in pursuit of conservative regulatory goals – to 
normalize “wildcat litigation.”  
 
III. LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE   
 In this Part we identify aspects of the modern history of litigation involving 
constituencies or interests associated with the Republican party that shed light on their 
perceptions of the normative legitimacy and practical utility of litigation and courts as avenues to 
purse their policy agendas, and the moves they made (and declined to make) to leverage them.  
This context will inform the interpretation of our data in Part IV. 
 Steven Teles’ 2008 book, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement,53 is perhaps the 
most comprehensive contribution to our understanding of modern conservative litigation. 
Together with Jefferson Decker’s more recent book, The Other Rights Revolution,54 it provides a 
rich account of conservative public interest law firms – how they got started, who their patrons 
were, why the first wave of them failed, and why the second wave succeeded.  Teles did not have 
much to say about Congress or about statutory private enforcement regimes and the role they 
play in stimulating private enforcement of federal rights. Decker’s research, however, unearthed 
that some leaders in the conservative legal movement were cognizant of, and opposed to, fee 
shifting.  One of those leaders was Michael Horowitz.  Decker explains:     
Horowitz saw fee-shifting [in suits against government] as an excessive drag on 
government budgets, at a time when he and others in the administration were trying to 
pare public spending to make room for tax cuts … Horowitz also objected to fee-shifting 
as a matter of principle. The United States, he argued, was on the verge of creating a 
state-sponsored private governing apparatus that was subject to neither the discipline of 
electoral politics nor the exigencies of the market.55 
Fee recovery by conservative litigation groups “was [also] eschewed by many … conservative 
legal foundations” and “legal conservatives who opposed fee-shifting as an institution.”56  At the 
time, conservative legal organizations were financed primarily by business.57     
 
53 TELES, supra note 21. 
 
54 JEFFERSON DECKER, THE OTHER RIGHTS REVOLUTION: CONSERVATIVE LAWYERS AND THE 
REMAKING OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2016). 
 
55 Id. at 142. Michael Horowitz was General Counsel of the Office of Management and Budget, 
who in the late 1970’s had written an influential report for the Scaife Foundation that is 
discussed below. See infra note 60. See also BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 8, at 29, 32-33. 
 
56 DECKER, supra note 54, at 171-72. See id. at 139-40. 
 
57 See TELES, supra note 21, at 58-89.    
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This opposition to fee shifting was arguably of a piece with the conservative legal 
movement’s distrust of courts as policymakers.  In both Teles’ and Decker’s accounts, 
embracing a more proactive and affirmative litigation strategy was critical to the second wave of 
conservative legal organizations’ pivot toward success.    
While conservatives successfully used resistance to the courts to                    
 attract converts to their cause, they quickly discovered that disentrenching             
 legal liberalism was an altogether more difficult matter… Conservatives slowly  
 recognized that they needed to develop their own apparatus for legal change,     
 one that could challenge liberal legalism in the courts, in classrooms, and                       
 in legal culture.58 
 Convinced that the movement needed “specialization [and] more hardball litigation rather 
than amicus briefs,”59 the founders of the second wave of conservative public interest firms 
eschewed the first wave’s dependence on the financial support of business, whose interests were 
not reliably aligned with their ideological goals.60 In concentrating on foundation and individual 
financial support, they sought the freedom to advance through litigation positions that were 
consistent with their principles even if contrary to business preferences. Moreover, they 
understood that a successful offensive strategy in pursuit of those goals would require (1) the 
articulation of counter-rights reflecting ideas and principles that would be counterweights to the 
prevailing liberal ethos, 61 and (2) the development of a conservative network capable of rivaling 
the Liberal Legal Network (LLN) that had proved durable even after the precipitous decline in 
 
 
58 Id. at 57. See id at 221 (leaders of second wave “had learned that conservative interests could 
only be protected by actively using courts to establish new or invigorate old rights, rather than 
simply standing in the way of the activism of the Left”); id. at 226.   
 
59 Id. at 67 (quoting  Michael S. Greve, Why “Defunding the Left” Failed, 89 PUB. INT. 91 
(1987)). See id. at 225 (discussing importance of becoming “’repeat players’ in specific areas of 
law”). 
 
60 See id. at 79 (“In fact … business could be the conservative movement’s most determined 
foe.”); id. at 221 (leaders of the second wave “established distance from business”); id. at 228. 
Both Decker and Teles discussed the importance to the development of the conservative legal 
movement of a 1978 report to the Scaife Foundation by Michael Horowitz, who criticized 
conservatives “for allying themselves too closely with the business community and allowing 
their funding sources to bias their litigation strategies.” DECKER, supra note 54, at 120. See 
TELES, supra note 21, at 68-70. 
 
61 See TELES, supra note 21, at 87 (summarizing CLINT BOLICK, UNFINISHED BUSINESS (1991)); 
DECKER, supra note 54, at 104 (“By defending counter-rights, conservatives showed how rights-
conscious legal activism might be a double-edged sword, capable of skewering the vested 
interests of liberal constituencies and demonstrating the hypocrisy and internal contradictions of 
the legal left.”); id. at 109. 
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Democratic power that started with the election of Richard Nixon.62 Finally, they also 
understood that such an offensive strategy would require rejection of the principle of “judicial 
restraint,” which was the rallying cry of conservatives’ defensive campaign.63 As put by Decker, 
  By teaching their fellow conservatives to stop worrying and love                      
  legal activism, the public interest right normalized strategic litigation          
  campaigns and showed how mucking up bad, unpopular, or excessively   
  egalitarian social policies could further the cause of American conservatism,       
  even when it undermined law, order, or the regularity of rules.64  
 Although Teles identified priorities and strategies that made the second wave of 
conservative public interest law firms successful, he also discussed characteristics that limited 
the scope of that success. Two in particular are of interest to this project. First, in seeking 
alternative, non-business, sources of financial support, conservatives relied primarily on funding 
by foundations and individuals, and on the pro bono services of lawyers. Second -- and perhaps 
in part because of dependence on practitioners willing to contribute their services pro bono -- the 
conservative legal movement concentrated on impact litigation, neglecting the creation of an 
 
62 “By the time that the Democrats’ electoral dominance began to crumble in 1968, many of the 
pieces of the LLN were already well developed. This previous organizational development and 
network-building laid the groundwork for the final, and in policy terms, most powerful, piece of 
the LLN: public interest law firms.” TELES, supra note 21, at 46. Teles does not appear to have 
recognized that most of the litigation was brought by for-profit lawyers, not public interest law 
firms. See supra note 50. 
 
63 See id. at 80 (noting that 1985 planning documents for a proposed conservative public interest 
law firm were “striking in their scant emphasis on ‘judicial restraint,’ which was still dominant in 
conservative jurisprudence and their insistence that courts should energetically protect a 
libertarian understanding of constitutional liberties”); id. at 83 (observing that 1987 proposal 
“embraced a proactive stance for conservative litigators and an assertive role for federal courts,” 
which, although “bitter medicine for a movement raised on ‘judicial restraint’ and ‘strict 
construction,’” was “necessary if conservatives were to cease the futile exercise of playing 
defense in the federal courts”); id. at 248; id. at 275. 
 
64 DECKER, supra note 54, at 9. See Logan F. Sawyer, III, Why the Right Embraced Rights (Book 
Review), 40 HARV. J. L & PUB. POL’Y 729 (2017). 
  Conservatives in the 1970s and 80s, Decker argues, believed in the effective use  
  of government authority when exercised by democratically elected branches, but  
  were dubious about judicial policy-making … Things are different today.   
  Conservative lawyers, politicians, activists, and voters have made “rights talk”  
  and an associated suspicion of government authority core ten[e]ts of   
  contemporary conservatism. Decker’s most striking claim is that this transition  
  was led by lawyers.  
Id. at 733. 
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infrastructure comparable to that created by liberals for the fructification of the rights secured 
through ordinary litigation.     
  Despite all their other strengths, conservatives continue to have little                                               
  of this sort of infrastructure, and as a result conservative law firms                             
  only have the manpower to take cases likely to set a significant precedent.                
  The need to correct this “disparity between these two philosophical sides                        
  in the number of lawyers who follow up on victories made by the public                        
  interest groups with whom they agree” was the most important motivation                   
  for the [Federalist] Society’s expansion of its involvement in pro bono law. 65   
               **** 
  Any legal movement needs to have an informal division of labor, with a             
  substantial pool of lawyers willing to engage in fairly routine but often labor-             
  intensive trial work that applies existing precedents. The conservative public  
  interest law field, by contrast, is top-heavy, with a reasonable number of lawyers       
  willing to volunteer for “A Team” work but few willing to participate at the  
  lower ranks. This vice may be inseparable from the virtues of the more libertarian  
  (as opposed to religious) side of conservatism … Christian conservatives, by  
  contrast … seem to have been more successful in drawing a wide base of lawyers  
  to bring non-precedent setting cases. 
  The dearth of conservative and libertarian lawyers willing to engage in pro bono  
  activity means that most conservative activism flows through [conservative public 
  interest firms], rather than bubbling up from below… This lack of unplanned,  
  entrepreneurial litigation reduces the opportunity for unorthodox legal strategies  
  or trial and error, and so conservatives are betting on the effectiveness of legal  
  strategies at the top of the legal food chain.66 
 
65 TELES, supra note 21, at 156. See id. at 155-56 (discussing the Federalist Society’s mid-1990s 
creation of a “pro bono clearinghouse to connect conservative and libertarian lawyers with 
ideologically sympathetic pro bono opportunities”). 
 
66 Id. at 254-55. “‘Lawyers on the right, they always want to be involved in the biggest, baddest, 
most precedent-setting case around. They don’t want to bring the follow-on cases. On the other 
hand, the Left has organized itself to bring the follow-on cases.’” Id. at 259 (citation omitted). 
See also ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE 
COALITION 156 (2008) (“All but three of the interviewed lawyers who engaged in litigation 
pursued primarily impact work rather than individual service”); id. at 154 (noting that sixty-five 
of the seventy-two lawyers whom the author interviewed engaged in litigation “at least 
occasionally”). For an interesting review essay that traces the influence of the work of Charles 
Epp on these books by Teles and Southworth, see Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Support Structures 
and Constitutional Change: Teles, Southworth, and the Conservative Legal Movement, 36 L. & 
SOC. INQ’Y 516 (2011). See also CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS 
AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998). 
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 Teles’ suggestion about “a wide base of lawyers to bring non-precedent setting cases” 
that is available to Christian conservatives may refer to the network of small firms described by 
Hans Hacker in his 2005 book, The Culture of Conservative Christian Litigation.67 The business 
model of such firms, however, appears to depend not on court-awarded attorney’s fees but on 
direct-mail solicitation and contributions by related organizations and wealthy patrons, together 
with volunteer attorneys.68 Moreover, although some of the firms Hacker described placed 
emphasis on service to “ordinary Christians,”69 the attitude toward “non-precedent-setting cases” 
of the leader of one of them differed.  According to Hacker, Jay Sekulow of The American 
Center for Law and Justice, 
  state[d] that he could continue to litigate free expression and equal access              
  claims if he chose, but he d[i]d not. “We don’t do much of that anymore because  
  in the area of equal access, the school cases, Bible clubs, we’ve won that,” he  
  stated when explaining the shift in litigation and other emphases. “I don’t like  
  spending a lot of money on something we’ve won three times before. I don’t feel  
  like wasting our resources that way. When we get cases like that we try to get  
  them resolved.”70                                     
In sum, as of Teles’ writing, the focus of the conservative legal movement remained impact 
litigation rather than the kind of routine enforcement that fee shifting can provide and that 
motivated liberal advocacy for it.    
  
 
 
67 HANS J. HACKER, THE CULTURE OF CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN LITIGATION (2005). 
 
68 See id. at 31-33, 64-65, 108-12, 140-41. See also STEVEN BROWN, TRUMPING RELIGION: THE 
NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT, THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE, AND THE COURTS  27-45 (ch. 3) (2002). 
Brown observes that the organizations he described seek attorney’s fees when available but that 
“[m]ore commonly, they solicit funds from supporters through … direct mail techniques.” Id. at 
122. 
 
69 Id. at 156. 
 
70 Id. at 28. See also BROWN, supra note 68, at 49-50 (noting a number of groups’ case-selection 
emphasis on setting precedent but distinguishing one group as “not requir[ing] that a case have 
precedent-setting potential”). Cf. Kevin R. den Dulk, Popular-Driven Lawyers: Evangelical 
Cause Lawyering and the Culture War, in THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS 56, 78 
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, eds. 2008) (“Even when the popular appeal of cultural 
conflict appeared to wane, evangelical attorneys managed to refashion their place in the war. The 
emergence of the warrior-hero heightened the importance of elite lawyering while diminishing 
the need for mass-based mobilization.”). 
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IV. EMPIRICAL DISCUSSION 
 
A. Data  
 
Our measure of preferences to mobilize private enforcement is the extent to which 
members sponsor or co-sponsor bills with a private right of action together with a provision 
allowing prevailing plaintiffs or parties to recover attorney’s fees.71  We include only rights of 
action for de novo suits against the targets of regulation.72  Of course, only a tiny fraction of bills 
are ever enacted.  But our purpose is not to measure change in law.  It is to measure legislator 
and party preferences and agendas.  For this purpose, bills are well-suited and extensively 
employed by scholars of legislatures.  As Professor Schiller explained in her widely cited study 
of how members of Congress shape legislative agendas: 
 
[A legislator’s] choice of bills is a strong indicator of which issues he or she wants to be 
associated with and the reputation he or she wants to acquire among colleagues. … 
Senators must be careful and deliberate in their choice of bills; bill sponsorship is no 
different in that regard than any other legislative tool. Since senators are free to introduce 
any number and types of bills they choose, their use of bill sponsorship should reflect 
their best assessment of the effectiveness of bills to accomplish their goals.73   
 
71 In addition to provisions for an award of fees to a winning plaintiff, provisions for attorney’s 
fees to a “prevailing party” or to “any party” were also included.  Although, read literally, these 
provisions could allow for fees to a defendant, courts have with few exceptions adopted a “dual” 
(and asymmetric) interpretation of such provisions under which fees are generally awarded to 
prevailing plaintiffs as a matter of course, but are only awarded to prevailing defendants in the 
rare cases in which it is established that the plaintiff’s action was brought in bad faith, was 
clearly frivolous or was brought for purposes of harassment.  See 1 ALBA CONTE, ATTORNEY FEE 
AWARDS 667-701 (3rd ed.  2004); Kerry D. Florio, Attorneys’ Fees in Environmental Citizen 
Suits: Should Prevailing Defendants Recover?, 27 B. C. ENV. AFF. L. REV. 707, 722-32 (2000); 
RICHARD E. LARSON, FEDERAL COURT AWARDS OF ATTORNEY’S FEES 85-97 (1981).  Courts 
have grounded this dual standard in congressional intent.  Given that Congress legislates against 
this longstanding interpretive background, it is appropriate to include such fee-shifting 
provisions, which asymmetrically benefit plaintiffs, in the analysis.  
 
72 We do not include rights to seek judicial review of agency action or rights to enforce agency 
orders.  Such rights are intended to control or facilitate (respectively) administrative authority.  
Our focus, in contrast, is direct private enforcement against the targets of regulation. 
 
73 Wendy J. Schiller, Senators as Political Entrepreneurs: Using Bill Sponsorship to Shape 
Legislative Agendas, 39 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 186, 187 (1995).  See also, e.g., Gerald Gamm and 
Thad Kousser, Broad Bills or Particularistic Policy? Historical Patterns in American State 
Legislatures, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 151, 154 (2010) (In study of locally focused bills, authors 
stated that “even the mere act of introducing … [a bill] sends a clear and transparent signal to 
voters and the local political establishment that a legislator is looking after their needs.”); 
Michael S. Rocca and Gabriel R. Sanchez, The Effect of Race and Ethnicity on Bill Sponsorship 
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Table 1: Policy Distribution of Bills 
Policy Area      Percent of Cases   
Labor and Employment     15% 
Civil Rights          11%   
Non-Discrimination     (6%) 
Policing     (3%) 
Free Speech and Religion   (2%) 
Information Privacy      11%  
Health Care       8% 
 Consumer       7% 
Abortion and Contraception     5% 
 Environmental & Energy     5% 
 Guns        4% 
Intellectual Property      4% 
Antitrust       3% 
Good Government       3% 
Property Rights        3% 
Public Health & Safety     3% 
Banking       2% 
Communications      2% 
Education       2% 
Immigration       2% 
Pornography & Sexual Exploitation    2% 
Veterans       1% 
Voting        1% 
 Other         6% 
  
  
Using the Library of Congress bill database, we identified a random sample of one half of 
the bills with private rights of action and fee shifting that were introduced during the three 
decades from 1989 through 2018.74  There are 857 bills in our sample.  The bills had an average 
of 24 co-sponsors, yielding a total of 21,146 instances of legislators sponsoring or co-sponsoring 
a bill with a private enforcement regime.  Ninety-five percent of the members of Congress who 
served from 1989 to 2018 supported at least one bill in our data, and those that did so ranged 
between supporting one and 115 bills.  Table 1 reflects the distribution of policy areas covered 
 
and Cosponsorship in Congress, 36 AM. POL. RES. 130, 132 (2008) (“[S]ponsoring legislation—
even bills that do not pass—shapes the legislative agenda. It is quite clear that the sponsorship 
stage of the legislative process has important policy implications.”) 
 
74 The search functionality of the database makes the collection of such bills much more onerous 
before 1989, and the goals of this article can be achieved with a three-decade dataset. 
   
21 
 
by the bills (for policy areas comprising one percent or more of the data).  The largest five policy 
areas are labor and employment, civil rights, information privacy, health care, and consumer.   
 
Using this collection of bills, we constructed the following dataset.  Separately for each 
legislator who served in Congress from 1989 to 2018, we calculated the total number of episodes 
of sponsorship or co-sponsorship per Congress. That is, the unit of analysis is a Congress-
legislator count of the total number of times that each legislator in each Congress sponsored or 
co-sponsored one of our bills.  We focus on counts that include both sponsorship and co-
sponsorship because we are interested in the comparative degree of legislative support for private 
enforcement across the Democratic and Republican parties. To neglect co-sponsors would be to 
treat a bill that a legislator introduces only for herself as equivalent to one that scores of other 
members of Congress wish to support.   
 
B. Partisan Variation in Legislator Support for Private Enforcement 
 
Figure 1 reflects regression estimates of total legislator support over time for private 
enforcement regimes.  The curve is generated with per-Congress counts of sponsorship and co-
sponsorship summed across all legislators. The horizontal axis designates the first year of each 
Congress in which bills were introduced.  Total support for private enforcement shows a decline 
in roughly the decade leading up to the 111th Congress (2009-10), after which there was a 
reversal to a growth trend through the end of the series. 
 
Figure 1: Total Support for Private Enforcement 
 
 
 
Figure 2 depicts support for private enforcement separately for Democrats and 
Republicans.  About the first two-thirds of the series appears consistent with conventional 
wisdom.  Over the past eight years, however, we observe a transformation that contradicts 
conventional wisdom.  After a decade (2001-10) in which Republican support was fairly stable at 
an average of 23% of the size of Democratic support in our sample, it grew to an average of 72% 
in the 112th and 113th Congresses’ (2011-14), and then reached approximate parity with 
50
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Democratic support in the 113th and 114th Congresses (2015-18).  Growth in Republican support 
for private enforcement has driven party convergence on the issue.   
Figure 2: Democratic versus Republican Total Support for Private Enforcement 
 
 
 
The pattern of growth in congressional Republicans’ turn to private enforcement lawsuits 
in the 112th to 115th Congresses (2011-2018) does not correspond to the conservative legal 
movement’s turn to impact litigation.  Professors Teles and Southworth identify some of the 
most important impact litigation victories of that movement as occurring from the mid-1990s to 
the mid-2000s.75  During this period, congressional Republicans’ use of private enforcement 
actually declined materially.  The Republican surge in legislative private enforcement proposals 
occurred much later.   
 
C. Policy Substance Underlying Growth in Republican Support for Private Enforcement 
 
We examined the bills in our data that Republican members of Congress supported over 
the past eight years.  In that window, there are five policy areas that comprise more than 5 
percent of Republicans’ total support.  These were private enforcement bills that were anti-
abortion, immigrant, and taxes, and pro-gun and religion.  These are policy agenda items of 
obvious salience to the Republican base.  We offer a few illustrative examples of each type of 
bill in order to convey a concrete picture of the policy agenda for which Republicans have turned 
increasingly to private enforcement.   
 
Abortion   
• The Born-Alive Abortion Survivors Protection Act of 2017 required that when “[a]ny 
infant [is] born alive after an abortion,” health care practitioners must exercise the 
 
75 See TELES, supra note 21, at 220; SOUTHWORTH, supra note 66, at 37 (2008). 
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same degree of care as provided to any other at that gestational age, and “ensure that 
the child born alive is immediately transported and admitted to a hospital.”  The bill 
provided a private right of action to the woman on whom the abortion was performed 
for money damages for all injuries, including for psychological pain and suffering, 
statutory damages equal to three times the cost of the abortion, punitive damages, and 
attorney’s fees.76   
• The Dismemberment Abortion Ban Act of 2016 provided a private right of action 
against doctors, with the same remedies and attorney’s fees, to parents of minor 
children on whom the doctor performed a “dismemberment abortion.”77   
Guns   
• The Firearm Due Process Protection Act of 2016 proposed to amend the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act to provide that the Attorney General must make a 
final disposition within 60 days of a request by any person seeking to obtain a firearm 
to correct a record in the federal background-check system.  For violation of this rule, 
the Act provides an aggrieved person a private right of action to obtain a declaratory 
judgment on their “eligibility … to receive and possess a firearm,” and an expedited 
hearing within 30 days in which the U.S. “shall bear the burden of proving by clear 
and convincing evidence that the individual is ineligible to … possess a firearm.”  If 
the government does not “prove the ineligibility,” the court shall award attorney’s 
fees to the plaintiff.78   
• The Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2015 provided that, notwithstanding any 
contrary state law, under certain conditions a person who is not prohibited from 
possessing a firearm under federal law, and who possesses a valid concealed carry 
permit in one state, has a right to carry a concealed handgun in any other concealed 
carry state.  It creates a private right of action against states for violating such right, 
with prevailing plaintiffs entitled to “damages and such other relief as the court 
deems appropriate, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”79   
• Republicans also introduced bills to protect the right to possess and carry knives, 
overriding contrary state law, and providing a private right of action against states 
 
76 Born-Alive Abortion Survivors Protection Act, H.R. 4712, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 
77 Dismemberment Abortion Ban Act, S. 3306, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 
78 Firearm Due Process Protection Act, H.R. 4980, 114th Cong. (2016).  
  
79 Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act, H.R. 986, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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that interfere with federal knife-possession rights, with attorney’s fees for prevailing 
plaintiffs (including those prevailing in settlements).80      
Immigrants   
• The Build the Wall, Enforce the Law Act of 2018 created a private right of action by 
any individual, or spouse, parent, or child of that individual (if deceased), who is the 
victim of a murder, rape, or any felony, for which an alien has been convicted.  The 
Act designated as defendants a state (or political subdivision) if it released the alien 
from custody as a consequence of declining to honor an Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement detainer, and provided for attorney’s fees (as well as expert fees) for 
prevailing plaintiffs.81   
• In 2014, Republicans introduced a bill which provided that “[a]n alien who is not 
lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible for any postsecondary 
education benefit unless every citizen and national of the United States is eligible to 
receive such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration, and scope),” and included a 
private right of action against state education officials for economic damages, with an 
award of attorney’s fees, for prevailing plaintiffs.82 
Religion   
• The Child Welfare Provider Inclusion Act of 2017 prohibited the federal government, 
or state programs receiving federal funds, from “discriminating” or taking an adverse 
action against a child welfare service provider that declines to provide, facilitate, or 
refer for a child welfare service that conflicts with the provider's “sincerely held 
religious beliefs or moral convictions,” such as an adoption or foster care agency 
declining to facilitate placement of a child with a same-sex couple.  The bill provided 
to an aggrieved child welfare service provider a private right of action and authorized 
injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and attorney’s fees.83   
• The First Amendment Defense Act of 2015 barred the federal government from 
discriminating against persons for acting in accordance with a religious belief or 
moral conviction that marriage is the union of one man and one woman, or that sexual 
 
80 See, e.g., Knife Owners' Protection Act, S. 3264, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 
81 Build the Wall, Enforce the Law Act, H.R. 7059, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 
82 A bill to prohibit aliens who are not lawfully present in the United States from being eligible 
for postsecondary education benefits that are not available to all citizens and nationals of the 
United States, S. 1990, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 
83 Child Welfare Provider Inclusion Act, H.R. 1881, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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relations are properly reserved to such a marriage.  The bill defined “discriminatory 
action” as any adverse tax treatment (including disallowing deduction of a charitable 
contribution), adverse treatment with respect to any federal grant, benefit, 
employment, license, or other opportunity.  The bill provided to an aggrieved person 
a private right of action, and allowed injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and 
attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs.84 
 Taxes   
• The Fair Tax Act of 2017 provided that persons in tax disputes with the IRS may 
recover reasonable attorney’s fees, as well as accountancy and other professional fees 
incurred in the dispute, unless the sales tax administering authority or the Secretary 
established that its position was substantially justified.85     
Figure 3: Republican Total Support for Private Enforcement in  
Top Five Issues versus Other Issues 
 
 
 
 
 
84 First Amendment Defense Act, S. 1598, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 
85 Fair Tax Act, S. 18, 115th Cong. (2017).  The fee shift applies to petitions for redetermination 
of deficiencies in the Tax Court.  “The Tax Court has as its purpose the redetermination of 
deficiencies, through a trial on the merits, following a taxpayer petition. It exercises de novo 
review.”  Mary Ferrariaa, “Was Blind, but Now I See” (Or What's. Behind the Notice of 
Deficiency and Why Won't the Tax Court Look?), 55 ALB. L. REV. 407, 446 (1991). 
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From the 101st to the 111th Congresses (1989-2010), this set of Republican base issues 
(the top five) constituted 12% of total Republican support for private enforcement.  From the 
112th to the 115th Congresses (2011-2018), they grew dramatically to 81% of total Republican 
support.  Figure 3 compares (1) Republican support for private enforcement in this set of 
Republican base issues, with (2) Republican support in all remaining policy domains.  The figure 
makes clear that these Republican base issues account for the growth in Republican support for 
private enforcement. 
By way of comparison, the top five policy areas of Republican support for private 
enforcement prior to the 101st to the 111th Congress (1989-10) were bills protecting private 
property against takings and other government regulation, information privacy, gun owner’s 
rights,  health care, and good government.  Bills directed at protection of private property against 
government86 and gun owner’s rights87 are Republican base issues and show that private rights of 
action and fee shifting to enforce a conservative rights agenda long predated the recent surge.  
However, the remaining three of the top five areas (data privacy, health care, and good 
government) do not have distinctive salience to the Republican base.88  Thus, the 112th to the 
115th Congresses (2011-2018) were characterized by growth not only in the volume of 
 
86 See, e.g., Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995), Private 
Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 
87 See, e.g., Second Amendment Reaffirmation Act of 1995, H.R. 2470, 104th Cong. (1995); 
Citizens' Self-Defense Act of 2003, H.R. 2789, Cong. (2003).   
 
88 We reach this conclusion after review of the Republican-sponsored bills in each of these areas.  
Representative bills in health care are the Medicaid Home and Community Quality Services Act 
of 1989, S. 384, 101st Cong. (1989) (cause of action for severely disabled persons against state 
agency that fails to protect their right to medical assistance under Medicaid); the Bipartisan 
Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act, H.R. 2723, 106th Cong. (1999) (cause of action 
against health care plans for failure to provide medical benefits determined to be due by external 
review board); and the Bipartisan Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 2001, S. 889, 107th Cong. (2001) 
(cause of action to participant or beneficiary against insurance providers for failure to make 
payments determined to be due by an external review entity).  In the area of good government, 
the Republican bill introductions focused heavily on the same proposal to create a cause of 
action for government employees retaliated against by employers for aiding a federal 
investigation or prosecution of election fraud or other political corruption.  See Anti-Corruption 
Act of 1989, H.R. 2083, 101st Cong. (1989); Comprehensive Campaign Finance Reform Act, S. 
7, 103rd Cong. (1993); Anti-Corruption Act of 1995, S. 1378, 104th Cong. (1995).  
Representative bills in information privacy are the Affordable Health Care Now Act of 1994, S. 
2396, 103rd Cong. (1994) (cause of action against health information trustee or government 
employee for unlawful disclosure of health information); Security and Freedom Through 
Encryption Act, H.R. 695, 105th Cong. (1997) (cause of action against law enforcement for 
unlawfully obtaining or disseminating decryption information); Protecting Consumer Phone 
Records Act, S. 2389, 109th Cong. (2006) (cause of action for unlawful acquisition or sale of 
“customer proprietary network information”).  
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Republican reliance on private enforcement, but also in their increasing focus on Republican 
base issues when deploying private enforcement. 
D. Causes of Growth in Republican Support for Private Enforcement   
 
The data thus document an unmistakable transformation.  Over the course of about the 
past eight years—since the 112th Congress, seated after the midterm election following Obama’s 
first term—there was sharp growth in Republican support for private enforcement.  This growth 
was mainly driven by proposals to leverage private enforcement in the service of the Republican 
base issues highlighted above.  Why did this happen?  We explore two possible causes, both 
suggested by the timing and substance of the transformation. 
 
Republicans’ enhanced support of private enforcement corresponded to an era of rapidly 
escalating conservatism in the Republican party, contributing to the party’s distrust of the Obama 
administration—the alternative source of enforcement for their agenda.  Regarding the rightward 
movement in the Republican party, NOMINATE scores—the most widely used ideology scores 
for members of Congress89—are illustrative.  From 1997 to 2006, the median Republican 
NOMINATE score increased (grew more conservative) by .016.  From 2007-16, it increased by 
.082.  Thus, in the latter decade the Republican movement in the conservative direction was 
more than five times larger than in the previous decade.  
 
We did not come to the data with an expectation that conservatism within the Republican 
party would be associated with support for private enforcement.  However, the Republican base 
issue content that we observe to be associated with escalating Republican party support for 
private enforcement in Congress, and the fact that this escalation followed a marked rightward 
shift in the party, leads us to test the hypothesis that conservatism within the party is associated 
with higher levels of support for private enforcement.   
 
We note that this is the opposite of what conventional wisdom would predict.  As 
discussed earlier, the conventional wisdom in American politics and law is that Democrats are 
the party more likely to support private enforcement, and Republican are the party more likely to 
oppose it. Figure 2 largely bears out this expectation for the first two decades of the period we 
study.  It is a short step from this conventional wisdom to the hypothesis that movement in a 
conservative direction is associated with less support for private enforcement, and therefore that 
more conservative Republicans will be less likely to support private enforcement.  This is also 
the story suggested by the notion, implicated in Parts II and III, that conservatism is associated 
 
89 The NOMINATE procedure is based on a spatial theory of voting and creates estimates of the 
ideological positions of legislators on an interval scale based on their pattern of roll call voting 
behavior.  See KEITH T. POOLE AND HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC 
HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997).  In this article we use Common-Space Constant DW-
NOMINATE scores, which are comparable across chambers and over time.  See Adam Boche, 
Jeffrey B. Lewis, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet, The new Voteview.com: preserving and 
continuing Keith Poole’s infrastructure for scholars, students and observers of Congress, 176 
PUB. CHOICE 17, 23-24 (2018).      
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with opposition to the use of courts to make public policy (a notion that we acknowledge is easy 
to doubt). 
 
A second and related pattern visible in the data suggests a second hypothesis for testing.  
Relative to the last two Congresses of Bush I (1989-92), average levels of Republican support for 
private enforcement grew in the Clinton years, then declined in the Bush II years, and then 
surged in the Obama years.  In the first Congress of the Trump administration Republican private 
enforcement proposals did not decline in accord with this pattern.  Thus, at a descriptive level, 
Republican legislators’ support for private enforcement appears to grow, on average, when they 
face Democratic presidents.  This pattern is consistent with theoretical and empirical scholarship, 
discussed in Part I, showing that under divided government Congress has greater incentives to 
enact private enforcement regimes.  The primary alternative to private enforcement is to delegate 
implementation authority to bureaucracy.  Therefore, when Congress distrusts the president to 
use bureaucratic power to implement its mandates, as under divided government, it has 
heightened incentives to mobilize private enforcement as an alternative or supplement to 
bureaucracy.90  
 
This theory and the evidence supporting it focus on enacted statutes.  Its goal is to 
explain how conflict between the majority party in Congress and the president drives the actual 
growth of private enforcement in American law.  In contrast, here we seek to explain changes in 
the role of private enforcement on the Republican party agenda, measured by bill support.  Still, 
the institutional logic underlying the scholarship on divided government has implications for bill 
introductions.  Republican members of Congress who support bills that they believe a 
Democratic president will not enforce, whether they are in the minority (unified government) or 
in the majority (divided government) still may regard private enforcement as a useful tool.   
 
This incentive would be most salient when the substantive rights in question would likely 
be opposed by the president.  Under unified Democratic government, just as under divided 
government when Republicans controlled Congress, members in the Republican minority surely 
recognized that President Obama was not likely to champion enforcement of Republican base 
issues such as abortion, immigrants, guns, taxes, and religion that constituted the lion’s share of 
their proposals relying on private enforcement during his presidency.  We thus test the 
hypothesis that increasing distance between Republican members and the president is associated 
with increased levels of support for private enforcement.   
 
It bears emphasis that the two putative developments just discussed—increasing 
conservatism of the Republican party and increasing distrust of Democratic presidents by 
Republican members of Congress—are linked.  As Republicans swung right over about the past 
decade, this simultaneously increased conservatism within the party and (on average) Republican 
members’ distance from Democratic presidents.    
 
In order to evaluate the effects of Republican members’ ideology and distance from the 
president on their support for private enforcement we use regression models (discussed in the 
 
90 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.   
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Appendix).  The dependent variable again is, for each legislator in each Congress, a count of the 
total number of instances of sponsorship or co-sponsorship, per Congress, for bills with a private 
right of action coupled with a plaintiffs’ fee-shifting provision.  We first examine models only of 
Republican members (dropping all Democrats from the dataset).  We have two key independent 
variables.  One is the Republican member’s ideology, measured with NOMINATE score, in 
which movement in the positive direction is movement in the conservative direction.  A positive 
and statistically significant coefficient on this variable will indicate that more conservative 
Republicans are more likely to support private enforcement; a significant negative coefficient 
will indicate that more liberal Republicans are more likely to do so; and a statistically 
insignificant coefficient will indicate that variation in ideology within the Republican party is not 
significantly associated with such support.   
 
 The second key independent variable is the Republican member’s distance from the 
president.  Poole and Rosenthal also construct presidential ideology scores in the NOMINATE 
space.  Whereas legislator NOMINATE scores are based on their rollcall voting behavior, public 
positions taken by the president on roll call votes are used to map each president into the 
NOMINATE space.  As our presidential distance measure, we use the distance on the 
NOMINATE scale between each Republican member and the president.   
       
We employ Congress fixed effects to account for potential confounding factors.  
Congress fixed effects account for any variables that change across Congresses that would take 
the same value for each member in that Congress, such as the extent of regulatory legislation 
proposed in each Congress (providing an opportunity to utilize private enforcement), budgetary 
constraints on funding bureaucracy that may fuel use of private enforcement, the lobbying 
priorities of groups and interests that may favor or disfavor private enforcement, and all political-
institutional variables that are fixed within years, such as divided government, seat shares held 
by each party, and divided party control of the two chambers of Congress.  The Congress fixed 
effects approach leverages only variation in the relationship between legislators’ party and their 
support for bills within that Congress.  This approach allows us to estimate the effects of party 
most effectively because it controls for the influence of any variables that change across 
Congresses that would take the same value for each member in the same Congress.   
 
We also include a dichotomous variable measuring which chamber the bill was 
introduced in, with Senate=0 and House=1.  Finally, the model does not include the last 
Congress (115th) because no NOMINATE scores have yet been created for President Trump.   
 
The top panel of Table A-1 (Appendix) reports results for the full period of the 101st to 
the 114th Congresses (1989-2016).  The ideology variable is insignificant.  Over the full period, 
support for private enforcement does not vary within the Republican party along ideological 
lines.  The presidential distance variable is statistically and substantively significant, with the 
predicted positive sign indicating that members more distant from the president are more likely 
to support private enforcement.  To put the magnitude in perspective, moving from the last 
Congress under Bush II to the first Congress under Obama, the average distance from a 
Republican member of Congress to the president is associated with a 35% increase in Republican 
legislators’ predicted count of support for private enforcement.  The chamber variable is also 
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significant, showing that Republican members of the House have predicted counts of support for 
private enforcement that are 44% higher than Republican members of the Senate.  
   
Our descriptive examination of the data leads us to consider the possibility that the 
politics surrounding private enforcement in the Republican party in Congress changed over time.  
We thus rerun the model over about the second half of the data, covering the Bush II and Obama 
administrations, from the 107th to the 114th Congresses (2001-2016).91  The results are reported 
in the bottom panel of Table A-1.  In this 16-year period, the ideology variable becomes 
significant with a positive sign.  Contrary to conventional wisdom that increasing conservatism is 
associated with less support for private enforcement, among Republican members increasing 
conservatism is associated with higher levels of support.  An increase from a very liberal 
Republican (5th percentile on the NOMINATE scale among Republicans) to a very conservative 
one (95th percentile) is associated with a 30% increase in support for private enforcement.  An 
increase from a moderately liberal Republican (25th percentile) to a moderately conservative one 
(75th percentile) is associated with a 13% increase in support for private enforcement.     
 
Presidential distance remains significant, and its magnitude grows larger during the 2001-
16 period.  Again, moving from the last Congress under Bush II to the first Congress under 
Obama, the average increase in distance from a Republican member of Congress to the president 
was associated with a 53% growth in support for private enforcement.  The chamber variable 
remains significant, showing that Republican members of the House have predicted counts of 
support that are 116% higher than Republican members of the Senate. 
 
 We reiterate that both the presidential distance variable and the ideology variable are 
associated with higher levels of support for private enforcement by more conservative 
Republicans.  This is because increasing degrees of conservatism among Republican members 
are associated with increasing degrees of distance from Democratic presidents.  Thus, the model 
identifies two pathways through which more conservative members have led the growing 
presence of private enforcement on the Republican legislative agenda.  One is that, even 
controlling for presidential distance, more conservative Republicans have disproportionately 
supported private enforcement.  The other is that, even controlling for legislator ideology, 
Republicans more distant from Democratic presidents, who are more conservative Republicans, 
have disproportionately supported private enforcement.92  Through these two pathways, the 
 
91 It is not possible to run the model only during the Obama administration, when Republican 
support for private enforcement was surging.  If the model does not span multiple presidential 
administrations, collinearity prevents inclusion of both legislator ideology and the presidential 
distance variables.  
    
92 This interpretation is confirmed by estimating the same model while dropping the presidential 
distance variable.  In that model, the ideology coefficient grows much larger, with the move from 
a very conservative Republican (95th percentile) to a very liberal one (5th percentile) associated 
with an 84% increase in Republican members’ support for private enforcement, and a move from 
a moderately conservative Republican (75th percentile) to a moderately liberal one (25th 
percentile) associated with a 37% increase in Republican members’ support for private 
enforcement.     
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Republican party’s swing to the right, in conjunction with a two-term Democratic president 
whom they deeply distrusted as an enforcer of the Republican base policy agenda, materially 
contributed to the dramatic growth of Republican support for private enforcement and to 
convergence in levels of support for private enforcement by the two parties, over about the past 
decade.      
 
Although our purpose here is to explain shifts in Republican preferences for private 
enforcement, we briefly report the same models presented in Table A-1, but run only on 
Democratic members (see Table A-2 in the Appendix).  Presidential distance is significant in 
both models.  Moving from the last Congress under Clinton to the first under Bush II, the 
average increase in distance from a Democratic member of Congress to the president was 
associated with a 30% growth in support for private enforcement, and the effect size increases to 
67% in 2001-16.  The chamber variable is significant in the full period, showing that Democratic 
members of the House have predicted counts that are 26% higher than Democratic members of 
the Senate, and it becomes insignificant in 2001-16. 
 
Ideology has a much larger association with Democratic support for private enforcement 
as compared to Republicans, and it is significant both for the full period and when we examine 
only the 107th to the 114th Congresses (2001-16).  In the full period, an increase from a very 
conservative Democrat (5th percentile) to a very liberal one (95th percentile) is associated with a 
470% increase in support for private enforcement.  An increase from a moderately conservative 
Democrat (25th percentile) to a moderately liberal one (75th percentile) is associated with a 182% 
increase support for private enforcement.  The much larger effect size for ideology among 
Democrats as compared to Republicans indicates that there is much more variation within the 
Democratic party, associated with member ideology, in support for private enforcement.  The 
association moves in the opposite direction from Republicans, with more liberal Democrats 
much more likely to support private enforcement.   
 
Viewing both parties together, then, the wings of the parties (more liberal Democrats and 
more conservative Republicans) are most likely to support private enforcement.  One 
interpretation of the separate Republican and Democratic models, with significant effects in 
opposite directions, is that the ideological wings of the party are more likely to pursue enactment 
of rights for their base, providing both more occasions to rely on private enforcement than 
moderates in their parties.  That is, support for private enforcement is in part a function of having 
an individual rights agenda.               
    
CONCLUSION 
 
Conventional wisdom about civil litigation as a source of party cleavage does not 
accurately reflect contemporary reality.  The party alignment hypothesis, construed as a claim 
about the parties’ central tendencies rather than an iron law, was a fair characterization over 
about the first two decades of our data (1989-2010), when Democrats were substantially more 
likely than Republicans to support private enforcement.  In more recent years, however, we 
found escalating numbers of Republican bills seeking to leverage private lawsuits to enforce 
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rights that were primarily anti-abortion, immigrant, and tax, and pro-gun and religion.  By the 
end of our data in 2018, Republicans were about as likely as Democrats to sponsor or co-sponsor 
statutory private enforcement regimes.  This transformation was led by the conservative wing of 
the party, spurred in part by apparent distrust of the Obama administration as an enforcer of their 
rights agenda.       
 
 One lesson to be learned from the partisan convergence on private enforcement, and the 
role of rights agendas and separation of powers conflicts in contributing to it, is that both parties’ 
posture toward private enforcement is instrumental.   Private enforcement is one institutional 
strategy for implementing rights.  Our evidence suggests that political parties do not have 
positions on private enforcement and access to justice as a matter of general principle, 
independent of the rights being implemented.  They have positions on private enforcement when 
it is or may be deployed in the service of specific agendas -- when it accrues to the advantage of 
some groups and the disadvantage of others.   
 
In Yeazell’s characterization in the opening paragraphs of this Article (which aptly 
represents conventional wisdom), Republicans regard civil actions as a “deadweight loss” and a 
“source of national shame,” leading them to “deplor[e]” it.  The transformation we have 
documented shows that their views are far more instrumental than this narrative implies.  When 
they mounted a campaign to create statutory rights for base constituents that were anti-abortion, 
immigrant, and tax, and pro-gun and religion, mostly under a president they distrusted, 
Republicans (especially more conservative ones) turned to private enforcement.  In this they 
followed a model laid down by Democrats and liberal interest groups decades earlier when they 
disproportionately faced Republican presidents.         
 
At the same time, the Republican party position on private enforcement is more complex 
than Democrats’, and this is owing to the distinctive preferences of key elements of their 
coalition: business on the one hand, and social conservatives on the other.  The surge in 
Republican support for access to courts has been clearly focused on social conservatives.  
Republicans’ top five areas of bill proposals in the 112th-115th Congresses (2011-18), comprising 
81% of their total support for private enforcement, disproportionately served the social 
conservative wing of the coalition.  With the exception of health care workers that provide 
abortions, none targeted businesses as defendants. 
 
Both Yeazell’s and Romano’s characterizations of litigation as a source of partisan 
cleavage focused on business’ role in the Republican party, and business’ antagonism toward 
private enforcement regimes under which they disproportionately are defendants.  This account, 
we believe, remains accurate.  In the domain of business regulation, Republicans have remained 
dramatically more likely to oppose private enforcement than Democrats even as they began to 
ramp up private enforcement of proposed new rights for the Republican base.93  The party’s 
agenda is not to disable the Litigation State, but to redirect it. 
 
93 In recent work we assembled data on bill introductions in Congress that sought to limit existing 
rights of plaintiffs to attorney’s fees and damages, and to change certain procedural rules so as to 
limit lawsuits.  See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 8, at 34-36.  The procedural rules were the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing class actions (Rule 23), sanctions (Rule 11), and 
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APPENDIX 
 
In our statistical models, the dependent variables are counts, for each legislator in each 
Congress, of the number of times they sponsored or co-sponsored bills in our sample.  A 
frequency distribution of the counts is presented in Figure A-1.  Because the distribution of event 
counts is discrete, not continuous, and is limited to nonnegative values, it is best modeled 
assuming that the errors follow a Poisson rather than a normal distribution.   
 
Figure A-1: Frequency Distribution of Legislator Counts of Sponsorship 
or Co-sponsorship per Congress 
 
 
 
 
Data with this distribution is generally modeled with a Poisson or a Negative Binomial 
count model.  The standard Poisson model assumes that the variance equals the mean.  If this 
assumption is violated because the variance exceeds the mean, overdispersion is present, and the 
Negative Binomial is the more appropriate model.  We relied on the likelihood ratio test of the 
 
offers of judgment (Rule 68).  In the book we analyzed proposed changes to fee shifting and 
damages only if they targeted federal rights, whereas for purposes of this footnote we examine 
all proposed changes to federal or state law since both reflect the Republican party’s agenda on 
private enforcement against business.  This data ends in 2014.  We examined it for the first three 
Congresses of the Obama administration (2009-14) and found that there were 75 such bills 
introduced, together comprising 887 acts of sponsorship or co-sponsorship of proposals to limit 
private enforcement on one of the dimensions we measured.  Seventy-five percent of these acts 
of sponsorship or co-sponsorship were for bills that sought to limit causes of action against 
business.  Republican members of Congress represented 95 percent of the support for these bills 
seeking to limit business exposure to lawsuits. 
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overdispersion parameter alpha to judge which model to use.94  In the Republican-only model 
(Table A-1), alpha is not significantly different from zero, and thus we employ the Poisson 
model.  However, in the Democrat-only model (Table A-2), alpha is significantly different from 
zero, and thus we employ the Negative Binomial model.  With respect to all models, we obtain 
substantively equivalent results with Poisson and Negative Binomial.     
 
We cluster standard errors on legislator because regression models without clustering 
would treat each legislator’s support for a bill as independent from her support for other bills, but 
episodes of bill support by the same legislator are not independent from one another.  Non-
independent observations add less information to regression estimates than independent 
observations.  Clustering standard errors on legislator adjusts standard errors to account for this 
and thereby avoids standard errors that are too small.95 
 
The coefficients of a count model are not directly interpretable.  In order to transform 
them into interpretable form, an x-unit increase in an independent variable translates into a factor 
change in the rate of the dependent variable given by exp(xβ).  Using the chamber variable in the 
model in Table A-1 covering the full period, for a coefficient .362 the factor change in the 
expected count for a one-unit change in the associated independent variable is given by 
exponentiating ((1)(.362)), which equals 1.44.  This means that when the independent variable is 
increased by one unit, holding other variables constant, the expected number of enactments 
increases by a factor of 1.44.  This is the equivalent of saying that the expected number of 
enactments increases by 44 percent.  This is how all marginal effects were computed.   
 
The marginal effects column in the tables indicates the change in the predicted count 
associated with an increase of one unit in the associated independent variable.  The meaning of 
“one unit,” however, varies materially across independent variables, and thus the marginal 
effects listed are not meaningfully comparable across independent variables.  The NOMINATE 
scale is continuous and spans -1 to 1, and the presidential distance variable ranges from 0 to 1.38, 
and thus the substantive meaning of the marginal effect associated with a one unit changed on 
those variables is not clear.  In the text, we translate the marginal effects into meaningful 
quantities by identifying the size of the effect associated with specific concrete changes, such as 
the difference in the average distance from a Republican member to the president for the last 
Bush II Congress and the first Obama Congress.   
 
In the Democrat only models (in Table A-2), we reversed the direction of the nominate 
scale because positive rates of change can be expressed more intuitively than negative ones, and 
doing so allows for clearer comparison to the positive rates of change associated with increasing 
conservatism in the Republican-only model.    
 
 
94 The leading treatment of count models is COLIN CAMERON AND PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COUNT DATA (2013). 
 
95 See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH, ch. 14 
(2013). 
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Table A-1: Poisson Model of Republican Legislator Support for Private Enforcement 
Provisions with Congress Fixed Effects 
 
101st to 114th Congresses (1989-2016) 
 
    Coefficient    Marginal Effect 
   
Ideology    .15      
(increasing in conservatism)  (.16) 
   
Presidential Distance  .51***    66%    
     (.12) 
 
Chamber    .36***    44% 
(Senate=0, House=1)   (.05) 
 
(Congress fixed effects not displayed) 
N=3,741 
Adj. Dev. R2 =.31   
 
107th to 114th Congresses (2001-2016) 
 
    Coefficient    Marginal Effect 
   
Ideology    .48**    61%     
(increasing in conservatism)   (.21) 
   
Presidential Distance  .69***    100% 
     (.20) 
 
Chamber    .77***    116% 
(Senate=0, House=1)   (.07) 
 
(Congress fixed effects not displayed) 
N=2,218 
Adj. Dev. R2 =.42   
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on legislator 
***<.01; **<.05    
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Table A-2: Negative Binomial Model of Democratic Legislator Support for Private 
Enforcement Provisions with Congress Fixed Effects, 1989-2018 
 
101st to 114th Congresses (1989-2016) 
 
    Coefficient    Marginal Effect 
   
 
Ideology    2.42***  1026%      
(increasing in liberalism)   (.14) 
   
Presidential Distance  .28**   32%    
     (.12) 
 
Chamber    .23***   26% 
(Senate=0, House=1)   (.05) 
 
(Congress fixed effects not displayed) 
N=3,876 
Adj. Dev. R2 = .35   
 
107th to 114th Congresses (2001-2016) 
 
    Coefficient    Marginal Effect 
   
Ideology    2.86***   1648%     
(increasing in liberalism)   (.22) 
   
Presidential Distance  .54**    72% 
     (.25) 
 
Chamber    .07      
(Senate=0, House=1)   (.06) 
 
(Congress fixed effects not displayed) 
N=2,137 
Adj. Dev. R2 = .39   
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on legislator 
***<.01; **<.05    
 
